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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 890175 
v. : 
KAREN MARIE JOHNSON, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, a class "A" misdemeanor, in 
the Third Judicial District Court. This Court granted certiorari 
from the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming the 
conviction. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether defendant was reasonably detained under 
fourth amendment standards as a passenger in a vehicle stopped 
for a defective taillight? 
2. Whether defendant failed to preserve a claim that 
her detention violated Utah Const, art. I § 14? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV.: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1982): 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act 
of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Karen Marie Johnson, was charged with 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class "B" 
misdemeanor, and possession of burglary tools, a class "B" 
misdemeanor (R. 7-8). Defendant was convicted of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, a class "A" misdemeanor, on 
April 1, 1987, after a bench trial in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding (R. 99). The remaining charges 
were dismissed on the State's motion. Id. Judge Uno placed 
defendant on probation for a period of one year (R. 98-99). 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's 
conviction on March 2, 1989. State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). (See Appendix "A"; opinion.) This Court 
granted certiorari on June 12, 1989 (R. 143). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 3, 1986, Deputy Sheriff Stroud stopped a 
vehicle for having a faulty brake light (T. 5-6). Defendant was 
a passenger in that vehicle (T. 7). At the suppression hearing, 
Stroud testified that prior to stopping the vehicle, he ran a 
check on the license plate and obtained the name of the 
registered owner (T. 6). He then approached the stopped vehicle 
and asked the driver for her license (T. 6). The name on the 
license was not the name of the registered owner (T. 6). 
When Stroud requested the registration certificate, the 
driver was unable to produce it (T. 6). Stroud then asked 
defendant for identification, reasoning that there was a 
possibility the car was stolen because there was no registration 
and no owner present (T. 6-8). After initially denying that she 
had any identification, defendant told Stroud her name and 
birthdate (T. 7). 
Stating that he would be right back and expecting the 
driver and defendant to remain, Stroud returned to his vehicle 
and ran license checks on the two, determining that the driver 
was driving on a suspended license and that defendant had several 
outstanding warrants (T. 7-8, 21-22). He did not, however, 
inquire as to whether the car was stolen, nor did he know of any 
reports of stolen cars matching that car's description (T. 12). 
He then wrote a citation on the driver and requested a backup 
police officer (T. 8). 
This factual statement is taken from the Court of Appeals 
opinion in State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 326-27 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). (See Appendix "A"; Opinion.) 
When defendant was informed that she was being arrested 
for outstanding warrants, she exited the vehicle, holding a 
backpack which had the name "Karen" on it (T. 9). Defendant 
initially denied that the backpack belonged to her, but later 
admitted that it was hers (T. 9-10, 29). Incident to her arrest, 
the bag was searched and was found to contain amphetamines, drug 
paraphernalia, and defendant's Utah identification (T. 10-11, 14) 
(State's Exhibit 1)• 
Defendant's version of the sequence of events varies 
from Stroud's. She testified that after Stroud received the 
driver's license, he asked defendant if she had any 
identification (T. 25). She said that she did not. ^d. He told 
them to wait, that he would be right back, and returned to his 
vehicle for five or ten minutes, long enough for her to smoke a 
cigarette or two (T. 26). When he returned, he asked for the 
registration certificate. Jki. When it could not be produced, 
Stroud asked defendant to return to his vehicle with him, where, 
at his request, she gave him her name and birthdate (T. 26-27). 
He then sent her back to the other car. Id. Fifteen minutes 
later, he came back to their car, gave the driver a citation, 
took defendant out of the car, frisked and handcuffed her, and 
put her in the front seat of the sheriff's car (T. 28). She had 
possession of her bag at this time (T. 28-29). Defendant stated 
that she gave Stroud her name and birthdate because she was 
required to do so, and did not believe that she could leave (T. 
27, 31-32). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant was reasonably detained under fourth 
amendment standards as a passenger in a vehicle stopped for an 
equipment violation. The officer had reasonable suspicion to 
detain the vehicle occupants to investigate whether the vehicle 
was lawfully possessed reasonable suspicion was based upon the 
articulated facts that the owner was not present and no 
registration was in the vehicle. Thus, trial court and Court of 
Appeals correctly concluded that defendant was not unreasonably 
detained under fourth amendment standards. 
Defendant failed to analyze or argue in the trial court 
a more restrictive search and seizure standard under art. I § 14 
of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, the Court of Appeals 
properly refused to address defendant's unpreserved claim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S DETENTION WAS REASONABLE UNDER 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. 
On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court erred 
in admitting evidence seized from her person incident to her 
arrest on outstanding warrants. She alleges that the evidence 
was the fruit of an illegal detention when she was temporarily 
restrained as a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a minor 
traffic violation. Defendant's claim must fail. 
The preliminary issue is whether defendant was actually 
detained. The trial court did not make a clear finding whether 
or not there was a detention (T. 48). Instead, the court ruled 
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that the deputy could have properly detained defendant for a 
reasonable period of time while investigating the traffic stop 
(T. 48). 
The Utah Court of Appeals went further and decided that 
defendant was seized "when Stroud took her name and birthdate and 
expected her to wait while he ran a warrants check." Johnson, 
771 P.2d at 328. The court found that "defendant was reasonably 
justified in her belief that she was not free to go." Ixi; see 
also State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (a 
seizure occurs when a reasonable person under the totality of the 
circumstances believes he or she is not free to leave); United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 
The State concedes that defendant was seized within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment when Stroud asked her to remain 
in the vehicle. However, the fourth amendment proscribes only 
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
Thus, the question remaining is whether the detention of 
defendant was "reasonable" under fourth amendment standards. 
The appropriate standard for investigative detentions 
was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the police officer observed 
two men hovering on a street corner for an extended period of 
time at approximately 2:30 in the afternoon. Terry, 392 U.S. at 
5. The officer, who had patrolled this neighborhood for 30 
years, observed the two men pace alternately along an identical 
route, pausing to stare in the same store window about a dozen 
times. Ld. at 6. Each completion of this route was followed by 
a conference between the two men on the corner. Ici. Based upon 
his observation, the officer suspected that the men were about to 
commit a robbery. Id. He further suspected that the men may be 
armed. JUi. 
The Court stated that in order to justify a seizure, 
the officer must point to specific articulable facts which, 
together with reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, would 
lead a reasonable person to conclude that a person had committed 
or was about to commit a crime. I_d. at 21. The Court went on to 
state: 
And in making that assessment it is 
imperative that the facts be judged against 
an objective standard: would the facts 
available to the officer at the moment of the 
seizure or the search "warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief" that the 
action taken was appropriate? Anything less 
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally 
guaranteed rights based on nothing more 
substantial than inarticulate hunches, a 
result this Court has consistently refused to 
sanction. 
Id. 392 U.S. at 21-22 (citations omitted). The officer is 
entitled to draw reasonable inferences in light of his experience 
in law enforcement. I_d. at 27; see also United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 564. (A trained law enforcement officer 
may be able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct 
which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.) 
The Terry Court emphasized that the reasonableness of 
an investigative detention depends upon a delicate balancing of 
the government's legitimate interest in crime prevention and 
detection and the privacy and personal security of individuals. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22. Applying these standards, the Court 
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concluded that the officer's "stop and frisk" were reasonable 
under the fourth amendment. j[d. at 30-31. 
The reasonable suspicion standard also applies to 
investigative stops involving vehicles. United States v. Sharpe/ 
470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985). When "an officer stops a vehicle for a 
traffic violation, he may briefly detain the vehicle and its 
occupants while he examines the vehicle registration and the 
driver's license." State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 
1989) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). An 
officer, for his own protection, may "order a driver out of a 
vehicle which has been stopped for a traffic violation." State 
v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d at 1135 (citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 
U.S. 798, 825 (1982)). Other courts have extended the Mimms 
ruling to allow a police officer to detain passengers in a 
routine traffic stop by also ordering the passengers out of the 
vehicle. People v. Branch, 134 Misc.2d 705, 512 N.Y.S.2d 642 
(N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1987); People v. Liviqni, 88 A.D.2d 386, 453 
N.Y.S.2d 708 (N.Y.App.Div. 1982), order aff'd. by, 58 N.Y.2d 894, 
460 N.Y.S.2d 530, 447 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1983); People v. David L., 
56 N.Y.2d 698, 451 N.Y.S.2d 722, 436 N.E.2d 1324 (N.Y.), cert. 
denied 459 U.S. 866 (1982). However, an investigative detention 
must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the detention in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 
20-21. 
Applying the foregoing authority, Deputy Stroud's brief 
detention of defendant was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances justifying the routine traffic stop. The objective 
facts articulated by Stroud in support of reasonable suspicion 
are as follows: (1) the vehicle was legally stopped for an 
equipment violation; (2) the driver was not the registered owner 
of the vehicle; and (3) there was no registration in the vehicle 
(T. 6). 
Reviewing these facts, the Court of Appeals deferred 
"to the findings of the trial judge because of his preferred 
position in evaluating the witnesses' credibility•" Johnson, 771 
P.2d at 328. The trial court found that: 
based on the evidence that has been given, 
and taking into consideration both the 
officer and the defendant were under oath and 
gave slightly different versions of exactly 
what happened, that the officer's testimony 
in regards to the stopping being based on a 
violation of the law and the driver not 
having produced the, I believe it was the 
driver's license that was valid at the time, 
plus having no registration, there was no 
indication of who the owner of the car was, 
and the officer had some question in regards 
to whether the car may possibly have been 
stolen, although the testimony that was given 
was that the — there was no recent notice 
that there was a stolen vehicle and 
particularly of this vehicle itself. 
There was no registration in the vehicle, 
and the driver herself was not the owner. 
I think the officer had a legitimate 
reason to ask the passenger as to her 
identity to determine the identity of the 
driver, because the vehicle's registration 
was not present, and the owner was not known, 
and I think the officer was exercising a 
legitimate concern in regards to the 
ownership of the vehicle and to whether the 
vehicle may have possibly been either stolen 
or being driven without possibly the owner's 
consent. 
(T. 46-47). Based upon these facts, the trial court concluded 
that "Deputy Stroud could have reasonably required defendant to 
_Q_ 
remain seated in the stopped vehicle while he completed the 
investigation and issued the citation." (T. 47-48.) 
Likewise, the Court of Appeals reviewed the record and 
noted "that the trial court believed Stroud's testimony in 
concluding there was an articulable suspicion that defendant had 
committed a crime." Johnson, 771 P.2d at 328. The Court of 
Appeals further noted that prior to asking defendant for 
identification, Stroud believed there was a reasonable 
possibility the car was stolen because the owner was absent and 
there was no registration. .Id. at 328-29. Stroud determined 
that it was "reasonable to ask defendant her name to determine if 
it corresponded with the owner's name he had learned prior to 
stopping the vehicle." JId. at 329. 
The Court of Appeals further explained that the fact 
that "Stroud initially chose to do a warrants check instead of a 
stolen vehicle check is of no great significance because not all 
stolen cars are reported immediately." j^ d. The court determined 
that the trial court was justified in determining that the brief 
detention of defendant, as a passenger, was reasonably within the 
scope of investigating whether the vehicle was lawfully 
possessed. Ld. The length of the detention of defendant as a 
passenger "did not take any longer than a normal traffic stop." 
Id. Thus, the Court held that the brief detention was not 
unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Id. 
Notably, one judge dissented from the Court of Appeals 
opinion. Johnson, 771 P.2d at 329 (Orme, J., dissenting). Judge 
Orme simply disagreed with the majority's conclusion that Stroud 
had an articulable suspicion that the car had been stolen. He 
would conclude that as a matter of law, !,the facts are just as 
consistent with the more likely scenario that the driver borrowed 
the car from its rightful owner." Id. In this appeal, defendant 
adopts Judge Orme's legal conclusion. However, Judge Orme's 
factual analogy is flawed. 
The key fact ignored in the analogy is that the 
occupants of the vehicle informed Stroud that there was no 
registration in the vehicle (T. 26). The lack of a vehicle 
registration goes beyond the otherwise reasonable "borrowed car" 
scenario. It was this fact that caused Stroud to inquire about 
defendant's identification and whether the occupants were 
lawfully in possession. Stroud's experience indicated to him 
that a vehicle occupants' failure to produce a valid registration 
is a reasonable basis to suspect that the occupants may not be in 
lawful possession. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable 
for Stroud to continue to detain the driver and defendant to 
maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more 
information. See, e.g., Mallerino v. State/ 190 Ga.App. 398, 379 
S.E.2d 210, 213 (1989) . 
In her brief, defendant cites several Utah cases in 
support of her claim that Stroud lacked reasonable suspicion to 
detain her. (Brief of App. at pp. 10-11 (citing State v. Sierra, 
754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 
(Utah 1985); State v. Swaniqan, 699 P.2d 719 (Utah 1985)). While 
these cases set forth the reasonable suspicion standard, they are 
distinguishable on one fact: each involved a determination of 
whether it was reasonable to initially stop the suspects. 
In the present case, defendant asserts that she was 
initially detained at the moment the vehicle was stopped for an 
equipment violation. (Brief of App. at p. 2 (citing Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, (1979); State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 
1132, 1135 (Utah 1985).) Since defendant had already been 
lawfully detained as a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a 
traffic violation, the inquiry is whether it was reasonable to 
continue the detention of defendant while investigating the 
traffic stop. 
In this vein, defendant argues that even if Stroud had 
a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen, this belief 
did not automatically implicate defendant in any illegal 
activity. (Brief of App. at p. 12.) In effect, she claims that 
a passenger in a vehicle suspected to be stolen may not be 
temporarily detained to investigate the suspicion. Defendant's 
argument lacks common sense. 
Several legitimate governmental interests are promoted 
by allowing a police officer to request that a passenger remain 
seated while investigating a routine traffic stop. First, the 
safety of the officer. Some experts suggest that it is safer for 
a police officer in a routine traffic stop to not allow the 
occupants to get out of the car. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 
106, 119 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Second, to solicit the 
passengers aid in identifying the driver and owner of the vehicle 
in determining whether the driver has the owner's permission to 
operate the vehicle. United States v. Harris, 528 F.2d 1327, 
1330 (1975). Third, to question the passenger whether he or she 
is licensed to drive in the event that the driver is unable or 
unlicensed to drive the vehicle from the scene of the stop. 
State v. Davis, 452 So.2d 1208, 1212 (La- Ct. App. 1984). 
Finally, where a routine traffic stop has escalated 
into something more based upon a reasonable suspicion that 
criminal activity is afoot, a police officer may detain the 
vehicle occupants for further investigation. Mallerino v. State, 
190 Ga.App. 398, 379 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1989). 
Defendant also cites United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 
89 (9th Cir. 1973), in support of her claim. However, the 
factual background in Luckett is clearly distinguishable from the 
case at hand. In Luckett, the police officer detained an 
individual to run a warrant check after the officer had issued 
the individual a jay walking citation. Id., at 90. Since the 
officer had satisfied the purpose of the initial stop, the court 
found that no justification based upon reasonable suspicion 
existed to continue the detention longer than necessary to issue 
the citation. I^d. at 91. 
In the instant case, defendant was detained only so 
long as necessary to issue the traffic citation to the driver of 
the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger (T. 8-9). 
Further, the detention was based upon reasonable suspicion that 
the vehicle in which defendant was seated was stolen (T. 7-8). 
Finally, defendant argues that "the decision of the 
Court of Appeals leaves officers with unbridled discretion to 
detain and run a warrants check on all passengers in vehicles 
where the owner is not present. (Brief of App. at p. 14.) 
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Again, defendant ignores the critical fact that the vehicle in 
which defendant was a passenger lacked a valid registration. 
While the absence of a vehicle registration is not proof that a 
vehicle is stolen, it does give rise to a reasonable suspicion 
that a vehicle is not lawfully possessed warranting further 
investigation by an officer. The Court of Appeals decision only 
validates a brief "investigative" detention of a vehicle's 
occupants if the owner is not present and there is no 
registration in the vehicle. 
Balancing the minimal intrusion on defendant's fourth 
amendment interests against the legitimate governmental interest 
in highway safety and crime detection, this Court should rule 
that the Court of Appeals and the trial court correctly found 
that the detention of defendant was proper in the course of the 
traffic stop and stolen vehicle investigation. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S MERE RECITATION OF STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS IN THE TRIAL COURT 
WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE FOR 
APPEAL. 
Defendant argues that article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution provides greater protections than the fourth 
amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant also 
argues that she sufficiently raised the state constitutional 
issue in the trial court to preserve the issue for appeal. 
Defendant's state constitutional claim should not be considered. 
While defendant's motion to suppress cited the Utah 
Constitution, her memorandum in support of her motion to suppress 
did not analyze or argue state constitutional grounds other than 
to simply allude to the state constitution (R. 20-28). The Court 
of Appeals stated that "[n]ominally alluding to such different 
constitutional guarantees without any analysis before the trial 
court does not sufficiently raise the issue to permit 
consideration by this court on appeal." Johnson, 111 P.2d at 328 
(citing James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987)). 
Similarly, this Court in State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 
(Utah 1986), stated that although "Dorsey refers to Article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution in his brief, he makes no 
attempt to rely on any asserted difference between the state and 
federal provisions, and we decline to make any separate analysis 
under Article I, section 14, assuming there is one to be made." 
Id. at 1087 n.2. See also State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 31 n.l 
(Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989) 
In the instant case, the trial court had no state 
constitutional arguments before it and could only decide the 
issue based on defendant's rights under the United States 
Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 150 Vt. 483, 555 A.2d 
369, 376-77 (1988), cert, denied, 109 S.Ct. 1155 (1989). As this 
Court has pointed out, "motions to suppress should be supported 
by precise averments, not conclusory allegations." State v. 
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 661 (Utah 1985) (footnote omitted). 
Defendant argues that because state constitutional 
principles are not well defined in Utah, she was not required to 
engage in state constitutional analysis to preserve the issue for 
appeal. She claims that merely reciting to the trial court the 
-15-
applicable state constitutional provision is sufficient to 
preserve the issue. Defendant's argument is self-contradicting. 
In defendant's brief before this Court, she has engaged 
in separate state constitutional analysis using the "sibling 
state approach" outlined in State v. Jewett, 146 Vt. 221, 500 
A.2d 233 (1985), and recommended by this Court in State v. Earl, 
716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1986). Notably, defendant cites three 
cases from other states in which the courts independently 
interpreted their respective state constitutional search and 
seizure provisions. State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 321 (Alaska 
1985); State v. Jackson, 102 Wash.2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984); 
State v. Williams, 366 So.2d 1369 (La. 1978), overruled on other 
grounds, State v. Mack, 403 So.2d 8 (La. 1981). Each case 
predates defendant's motion to suppress and could have been 
brought to the attention of the trial court. 
Defendant's claimed "never-never land" of state 
constitutional analysis is nothing more than studied ignorance. 
Case law and periodicals on state constitutional analysis are 
legion. It must be the responsibility of counsel for a criminal 
defendant to fairly raise a state constitutional issue so as to 
permit the trial court to make a ruling based upon legal analysis 
and authority. The trial court cannot be expected to create 
novel state constitutional principles out of "whole cloth." 
In the present case, defendant merely recited the state 
constitutional provision without even claiming that the state 
provision should be interpreted more narrowly or broadly than the 
federal constitution. The trial court was not requested to 
differentiate between the state and federal constitutions and 
hence made its ruling solely on federal constitutional 
principles. Because defendant failed to argue in the trial court 
that state constitutional provisions are more protective than 
their federal counterparts, this Court should decline to consider 
her state constitutional claim on direct appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests that 
defendant's conviction be affirmed. . 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this C& day"~bf March, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
General 
.. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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8TATE of Utah. Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Karen Marie JOHNSON, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 870222-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 21, 1989. 
Rehearing Denied April 5, 1989. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District, Salt Lake County, Raymond S. 
Uno, J., of possession of controlled sub-
stance, and she appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Garff, J., held that* (1) motor 
vehicle passenger was seized within mean-
ing of Fourth Amendment when deputy 
sheriff who had stopped vehicle took pas-
senger's name and birthdate and expected 
her to wait while he ran warrants check, 
but (2) seizure of passenger, who became 
defendant, constituted temporary detention 
supported by reasonable articulable suspi-
cion that passenger had committed crime. 
Affirmed. 
Orme, J., filed dissenting opinion. 
1. Criminal Law *=»103CK2) 
Court of Appeals would not consider 
claim raised for first time on appeal, that 
Utah Constitution and law provide greater 
protection than Fourth Amendment of 
United States Constitution against unrea-
sonable search and seizure. U.S.C.A. 
ConsLAmend. 4; Const Art 1, J 14; U.C. 
A.1953, 77-7-15. 
2. Arrest *=*8<4) 
Motor vehicle passenger was seized 
within meaning of Fourth Amendment 
when deputy sheriff who had stopped ve-
hicle took passenger's name and birthdate 
and expected her to wait while he ran war 
rants check; under totality of the circum-
stances, passenger was reasonably justified 
in belief that she was not free to go. U.S 
C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
3. Automobiles *=»349(17, 18) 
Fourth Amendment seizure of motoi 
vehicle passenger constituted temporary 
detention supported by reasonable articula-
ble suspicion that passenger had committed 
crime; trial judge believed deputy sheriffs 
testimony that deputy believed there was 
possibility vehicle he had stopped for hav-
ing faulty brake light was stolen as driver 
was not registered owner and was unable 
to find vehicle registration, it was reason-
able to ask passenger her name to deter-
mine if her names corresponded with own-
er's name that had been learned prior to 
stopping of vehicle, and passenger was not 
detained for unreasonable period of time. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 4. 
Debra K. Loy, Joan C. Watt (argued), 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Atty. Gen., Dan R. 
Larsen (argued), Asst Atty. (Jen., for 
plaintiff and respondent 




Defendant, Karen Marie Johnson, ap-
peals the trial court's denial of her motion 
to suppress and her conviction for posses-
sion of a controlled substance.1 We affirm. 
On November 8, 1986, Deputy Sheriff 
Stroud stopped a vehicle for having a 
faulty brake light Defendant was a pas-
senger in that vehicle. At the suppression 
hearing, Stroud testified that prior to 
stopping the vehicle, he ran a check on the 
license plate and obtained the name of the 
registered owner. He then approached the 
stopped vehicle and asked the driver for 
her license. The name on the license was 
not the name of the registered owner. 
I. At a bench trial, defendant was convicted on 
stipulated facts testified to at a previous hearing 
on defendant's motion to suppress. 
STATE v. JOHNSON 
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When Stroud requested the registration 
certificate, the driver was unable to pro-
duce it Stroud then asked defendant for 
identification, reasoning that there was a 
possibility the car was stolen because there 
was DO registration and no owner present. 
After initially denying that she had any 
identification, defendant told Stroud her 
name and birth date. 
Stating that he would be right back and 
expecting the driver and defendant to re 
main, Stroud returned to his vehicle and 
ran license checks on the two, determining 
that the driver was driving on a suspended 
license and that defendant had several out-
standing warrants. He did not, however, 
inquire as to whether the car was stolen, 
nor did he know of any reports of stolen 
cars matching that car's description. He 
then wrote a citation on the driver and 
requested a backup police officer. 
When defendant was informed that she 
was being arrested for outstanding war-
rants, she exited the vehicle, holding a 
backpack which had the name "Karen" on 
it Defendant initially denied that the 
backpack belonged to her, but later admit-
ted that it was hers. Incident to her ar-
rest, the bag was searched and was found 
to contain amphetamines, drug parapherna-
lia and defendant's Utah identification. 
Defendant's version of the sequence of 
events varies from Stroud's. She testified 
that after Stroud received the driver's li-
cense, he asked defendant if she had any 
identification. She said that she did not 
He told them to wait, that he would be 
right back, and returned to his vehicle for 
five or ten minutes, long enough for her to 
smoke a cigarette or two. When he re-
turned, he asked for the registration certif-
icate. Wrhen it could not be produced, 
Stroud asked defendant to return to his 
vehicle with him, where, at his request, she 
gave him her name and birthdate. He then 
sent her back to the other car. Fifteen 
minutes later, he came back to their car, 
gave the driver a citation, took defendant 
out of the car, frisked and handcuffed her, 
2» Utah has never drawn any distinctions be-
tween these two provisions and has "always 
considered the protections afforded to be one 
and the same." State v. Watts. 750 P.2d 1219. 
and put her in the front seat of the sher-
iffs car. She had possession of her bag at 
this time. Defendant stated that she gave 
Stroud her name and birthdate because she 
was required to do so, and did not believe 
that she could leave. 
The issues on appeal are: (1) whether 
defendant may raise, for the first time on 
appeal, the argument that state law and 
article 1 section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
provide greater protection than the fourth 
amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion against unreasonable search and sei-
zure; (2) whether defendant, a passenger 
in a motor vehicle, was seized within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment; and (3) 
if there was a seizure, whether it was 
reasonable. 
In considering the trial court's action in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress, 
we will not disturb its factual evaluation 
unless its findings are clearly erroneous. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 19*1, 193 (Utah 
1987). The trial judge is in the best posi-
tion to assess the credibility and accuracy 
of the witnesses' divergent testimonies. 
State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153, 154-156, 
(Utah Ct.App.1989); State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 974 (Utah Ct.App.1988). How-
ever, in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based upon its factual findings, 
we afford it no deference but apply a "cor-
rection of error" standard. Oates v. Cho-
vez, 749 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah 1988). 
UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE 
[1] Defendant claims that her detention 
violated the fourth amendment of the Unit-
ed States Constitution and article 1, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution. She also ar-
gues that the legislative intent behind Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1980) was to provide 
greater protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures than is provided by 
the fourth amendment, and that her sei-
zure violated the provisions of both consti-
tutions.1 However, defendant failed to 
1221 (Utah 1988). However, in a footnote com-
ment, the court indicated that it has not ruled 
out the possibility of making such a distinction 
in a future case. Id. at n. 8. 
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brief or argue these issues at the trial level 
and first raised her statutory argument in 
her appellate brief. Nominally alluding to 
such different constitutional guarantees 
without any analysis before the trial court 
does not sufficiently raise the issue to per-
mit consideration by this court on appeal. 
James r. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 
CtApp.1987). "[W]here a defendant fails 
to assert a particular ground for suppress-
ing unlawfully obtained evidence in the tri-
al court, an appellate court will not consid-
er that ground on appeal [MJotions to 
suppress should be supported by precise 
averments, not conclusory allegations " 
Stat* v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 
1985). Also, in State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 
53 (Utah 1981), the supreme court stated: 
There is nothing in the record to indicate 
that the point now urged upon this Court 
was unavailable or unknown to defen-
dant at the time he filed his motion to 
suppress, and to entertain the point now 
would be to sanction the practice of with-
holding positions that should properly be 
presented to the trial court but which 
may be withheld for the purpose of seek-
ing a reversal on appeal and a new trial 
or dismissal. 
We, therefore, decline to consider this ar-
gument on appeal. 
SEIZURE 
[2] Defendant avers that she was 
seized within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment because she felt that she was 
not free to leave when Stroud told her to 
wait while he returned to his vehicle to 
check on the driver's license and to run a 
warrants check on defendant "A seizure 
within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment occurs only when the officer by 
means of physical force or show of authori-
ty has in some way restricted the liberty of 
a person." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 
87 (Utah CtApp.1987). Further, "[w]hen a 
reasonable person, based on the totality of 
the circumstances, remains, not in the spir-
it of cooperation . . . but because he be-
lieves he is not free to leave," a seizure 
occurs. Id; see also United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct 
1870, 1877, 64 LEd.2d 497 (1980). Defen-
dant was, therefore, seized when Strou( 
took her name and birthdate and expected 
her to wait while he ran a warrants check 
Under the totality of the circumstances 
defendant was reasonably justified in her 
belief that she was not free to go. 
(3] Now, the concern is whether the 
seizure was reasonable and permissible un-
der the fourth amendment. In State v. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) (per 
curiam), the Utah Supreme Court adopted 
the reasoning in United States v. Merritt, 
736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir.1984), wherein 
the Fifth Circuit specified three constitu-
tionally permissible levels of police stops: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long 
as the citizen is not detained against his 
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if 
the officer has an "articulable suspicion" 
that the person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime; however, the 
"detention must be temporary and last 
no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer has 
probable cause to believe an offense has 
been committed or is being committed. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617-18. 
We conclude that the present case in-
volves a "level two" stop. Thus, to justify 
the seizure, Stroud had to have a reason-
able "articulable suspicion" that defendant 
had committed a crime. To determine if he 
acted reasonably under the circumstances, 
"due weight must be given, not to his in-
choate and unparticularized suspicion or 
'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable in-
ferences which he is entitled to draw from 
the facts in light of his experience." Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct 1868, 1883, 
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 
At this point, we defer to the findings of 
the trial judge because of his preferred 
position in evaluating the witnesses' credi-
bility. See Arroyo, at 154-156. The 
record indicates that the trial court be-
lieved Stroud's testimony in concluding 
there was an articulable suspicion that de-
fendant had committed a crime. Prior to 
asking defendant for identification, Stroud 
8TATE •. JOHNSON 
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believed that there was a possibility the car 
was stolen because the owner was absent 
and there was no registration He knew 
that the driver was not the owner, but 
determined that it was reasonable to ask 
defendant her name to determine if it cor-
responded with the owner's name he had 
learned prior to stopping the vehicle The 
fact that Stroud initially chose to do a 
warrants check instead of a stolen vehicle 
check is of no great significance because 
not all stolen cars are reported immediate-
ly. The trial judge stated that where there 
is a legitimate traffic stop, the driver has a 
suspended license, and there is "no way of 
telling who the owner of the vehicle is and 
whether they have permission to drive it 
because the owner is not present," a rea-
sonable officer would inquire regarding the 
identity of a passenger. In weighing the 
testimony, the court was justified in find-
ing that the amount of time defendant was 
required to wait, even though a passenger, 
was reasonable and did not take any longer 
than a normal traffic stop 
Thus, there was substantial evidence for 
the trial court to find as it did Although a 
seizure occurred, it conformed to constitu-
tional requirements in that Officer Stroud 
had a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
the car could have been stolen, and defen-
dant was not detained for an unreasonable 
period of time. We, therefore, affirm de-
fendant's conviction. 
DAVIDSON, J., concurs. 
ORME, Judge (dissenting): 
Although the legal analysis applicable to 
this case is ably set out in the majority's 
opinion, I cannot agree with their ultimate 
conclusion that the arresting officer had an 
articulable suspicion that the automobile 
had been stolen, much less that defendant 
had in any way participated in the theft. 
The only facts relied on by the officer 
were that the driver's name was not the 
name of the registered owner and the driv-
er was not able to locate the registration 
certificate. These facts are just as consist-
ent with the more likely scenario that the 
driver borrowed the car from its rightful 
owner. Absent more—and this is all the 
officer pointed to—there was simply no 
articulable suspicion, as a matter of law, 
that the car had been stolen 
I would accordingly reverse. 
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